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Abstract
Crypto-currencies are digital assets designed to work as a medium of exchange, e.g., Bitcoin,
but they are susceptible to attacks (dishonest behavior of participants). A framework for the
analysis of attacks in crypto-currencies requires (a) modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze
incentives for deviation from honest behavior; (b) concurrent interactions between participants;
and (c) analysis of long-term monetary gains. Traditional game-theoretic approaches for the
analysis of security protocols consider either qualitative temporal properties such as safety and
termination, or the very special class of one-shot (stateless) games. However, to analyze general
attacks on protocols for crypto-currencies, both stateful analysis and quantitative objectives
are necessary. In this work our main contributions are as follows: (a) we show how a class
of concurrent mean-payoff games, namely ergodic games, can model various attacks that arise
naturally in crypto-currencies; (b) we present the first practical implementation of algorithms for
ergodic games that scales to model realistic problems for crypto-currencies; and (c) we present
experimental results showing that our framework can handle games with thousands of states and
millions of transitions.
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1 Introduction
Economic effects of security violations. Traditionally, automated security analysis of
protocols using game-theoretic frameworks focused on qualitative properties, such as safety
or liveness [26, 16, 1], to ensure absolute security. In many cases absolute security is too
expensive, and security violations are inevitable. In such scenarios rather than security,
the economic implications of violations should be accounted for. In general, economic
consequences of security violations are hard to measure. However, there is a new application
area of crypto-currencies, in which the economic impact of an attack can be measured in
terms of the number of coins that are lost. These currencies have considerable market value,
in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars [18], thus developing a framework to formally
analyze the security violations and their economic consequences for crypto-currencies is an
interesting problem.
Crypto-currencies. There are many active crypto-currencies today, some with considerable
market values. Currently, the main crypto-currency is Bitcoin with a value of over 150 billion
dollars at the time of writing [18]. Virtually all of these currencies are free from outside
governance and authority and are not controlled by any central bank. Instead, they work
based on the decentralized blockchain protocol. This protocol, which was first developed for
monetary transactions in Bitcoin [31], sets down the rules for creating new units of currency
and valid transactions. However, it only defines the outcomes of actions taken by involved
parties and cannot dictate the actions themselves. So, the whole ecosystem operates in a
game-theoretic manner. The lack of an authority also leads to irreversibility of transactions,
so if an amount of currency is transferred unintentionally or due to a bug, it cannot be
reclaimed. This, together with the huge market values, makes it imperative to develop formal
methods for quantifying the economic consequences before deploying the protocols.
Dishonest interaction. The fact that protocols define only the outcomes of actions and do
not force the actions themselves, means that in some scenarios they might give one of the
parties unfair or unintended advantage over others and an incentive to act dishonestly, i.e. to
take an unintended action. Such behavior is called an attack. We succinctly describe some
attacks.
The most fundamental attack in every crypto-currency is double-spending, where one party
could in some circumstances use the same coin twice in two different purchases. While this
vulnerability is inherent in every blockchain protocol, people still use crypto-currencies as
the probability (and the economic consequences) of such an attack can be bounded over
time.
Another line of attacks follow from dishonest behavior of the blockchain miners who are
responsible for the underlying security of the blockchain protocol and are rewarded for
their operations. It was shown that undesirable behavior, such as block withholding [19]
or selfish mining [20], could increase the dishonest miner’s reward, at the expense of other
(honest) miners. We explain the block withholding attack in more detail in Section 5.1.
Research Questions. Analyzing attacks on crypto-currencies requires a formal framework
to handle: (a) game-theoretic aspects and incentives for dishonest behavior; (b) simul-
taneous interaction of the participants; and (c) quantitative properties corresponding to
long-term monetary gains and losses. These properties cannot be obtained from standard
temporal or qualitative properties which have been the focus of previous game-theoretic
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frameworks [26, 16]. On the other hand, game-theoretic incentives are also analyzed in
the security community (e.g., see [8]), but their methods are normally considering the very
special case of one-shot (stateless) or short-term games. One-shot games cannot model the
different states of the ecosystem or the history of actions taken.
Concurrent mean-payoff games. These games were introduced in the seminal work of
Shapley [37], and later extended by Gillette [22]. A concurrent mean-payoff game is played
by two players over a finite state space, where at each state both players simultaneously
choose actions. The transition to the next state is determined by their joint actions, and each
transition is assigned a reward. The goal of one player is to maximize the long-run average of
the rewards, and the other player tries to minimize it. These games provide a very natural and
general framework to study stateful games with simultaneous interactions and quantitative
objectives. They lead to a very elegant and mathematically rich framework, and the theoretical
complexity of such games has been studied for six decades [37, 22, 5, 24, 30, 14, 23]. However,
the analysis of concurrent mean-payoff games is computationally intractable and no practical
(such as strategy-iteration) algorithms exist to solve these games. Existing algorithmic
approaches either require the theory of reals and quantifier elimination [14] or have doubly-
exponential time complexity in the number of states [23].
Our contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
1. Modeling. We propose to model long-term (infinite-horizon) economic aspects of security
violations as concurrent mean-payoff games, between the attacker and the defender. The
guaranteed payoff in the game corresponds to the maximal loss of the defender. In
particular, for blockchain protocols, where the utility of every transition is naturally
measurable, we show how to model various interesting scenarios as a sub-class of concurrent
mean-payoff games, namely, concurrent ergodic games. In these games all states are
visited infinitely often with probability 1.
2. Practical implementation. Second, while for concurrent ergodic games a theoretical
algorithm (strategy-iteration algorithm) exists that does not use theory of reals and
quantifier elimination, no previous implementation exists. Moreover, the implementation
of the theoretical algorithm poses practical challenges: (a) the algorithm guarantees
convergence only in the limit; and (b) the algorithm requires high numerical precision and
the straightforward implementation of the algorithm does not converge in practice. We
present (i) a simple stopping criterion for approximation, and (ii) resolve the numerical
precision problem; and to our knowledge present the first practical implementation of a
solver for concurrent ergodic games.
3. Experimental results. Finally, we present experimental results and show that the
solver for ergodic games scales to thousands of states and nearly a million transitions
to model realistic analysis problems from crypto-currencies. Note that in comparison,
approaches for general concurrent mean-payoff games cannot handle even ten transitions
(see the Remark in Section 3). Thus we present orders of magnitude of improvement.
2 Crypto-Currencies
Monetary system. A crypto-currency is a monetary system that allows secure transactions
of currency units and dictates how new units are formed. Each transaction has a unique id
and the following components: (i) a set of inputs; and (ii) a set of outputs and (iii) locking
scripts. Each input has a pointer to an output of a previous transaction, and each output
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Figure 1 The longest chain dictates that the transaction tx belongs to Bob.
has an assigned monetary value. A locking script on an output defines a condition for using
the funds stored in that output, e.g. the need for a digital signature. An input can only use
funds of an output by passing its locking script.
Validity. A transaction is valid if these conditions hold: (a) the total value brought by the
outputs is greater than or equal to the total value of the inputs; (b) the inputs have not been
spent before; (c) the inputs satisfy locking scripts.
A transaction-based system is not secure if transactions are sent directly between users to
transfer units. While validity conditions are enough to make sure that only valid recipients
could redirect units they once truly held, there is nothing in the transactions themselves to
limit the user from spending the same output twice (in two different transactions). For this
purpose a public ledger of all valid transactions, called a blockchain, is maintained.
Blockchain. A ledger is a distributed database that maintains a growing ordered list of valid
transactions. Its main novelty is that it enforces consensus among untrusted and possibly
adversarial parties [31]. In Bitcoin (and most other major crypto-currencies) the public
ledger is implemented as a series of blocks of transactions, each containing a reference to its
previous block, and is hence called a blockchain. A consensus on the chain is obtained by a
decentralized pseudonymous protocol. Any party tries to collect new transactions, form a
block and add it to the chain (this process is called block mining). However, in order to do
so, they must solve a challenging computational puzzle (which depends on the last block of
the chain). The process of choosing the next block is as follows:
1. The first announced valid block that solves the puzzle is added to the chain.
2. If two valid blocks are found approximately at the same time (depending on network
latency), then there is a temporary fork in the chain.
Every party is free to choose either fork, and try to extend it. Hence, the underlying
structure of the blockchain is a tree. At any given time, the longest path in the tree, aka the
longest chain, is the consensus blockchain (see Figure 1). Due to the random nature of the
computational puzzle one branch will eventually become strictly longer than the other, and
all parties will adopt it.
Mining process. The puzzle asks for a block consisting of valid transactions, hash of the
previous block and an arbitrary integer nonce, whose hash is less than a target value. The
random nature of the hash function dictates a simple strategy for mining: try random nonces
until a solution is found. So the chance of a miner to find the next block is proportional to
their computational power.
Incentives for mining. There are two incentives for miners: (i) Every transaction can
donate to the miner who finds a new block that contains it, (ii) Each block creates a certain
number of new coins which are then given to the miner.
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Pool mining. To lower the variance of their revenue, miners often collaborate in pools [35, 8].
The pools have a manager who collects the rewards from valid blocks found by the members
and allocates funds to them in proportion to the amount of work they did. Members prove
their work by sending partial solution blocks, which are blocks with valid transactions but
lower difficulty level, i.e., the hash of the block is not smaller than the network threshold,
but it is lower than some threshold that was defined by the manager. As a result, pool
members obtain lower variance in rewards, but have a small drop in expected revenue to
cover the manager’s fee. Members will get the same reward for a partial and full solution,
but the member cannot claim the full block reward for themselves. More precisely, a block
also dictates where the block reward goes to. Hence, even if a member broadcasts the new
block, the reward will still go to the manager.
Proof of stake mining. An emerging criticism over the huge amount of energy that is
wasted in the mining process led to development of proof of stake protocols. In proof of stake
mining the miner is elected with probability that is proportional to their stake in the network
(i.e., number of coin units he holds), rather than their computation power. Current proof of
stake protocols assume a synchronous setting [32, 40, 28] where a miner is chosen in every
time slot t0. However, they differ in the way they reach consensus. We study a simplified
version of [28].
1. At time t0 a miner is randomly elected. She broadcasts the next block.
2. Until time t0 + t other miners who receive the block, verify it and if it were valid, sign it
and broadcast the signature.
3. The block is added to the chain only if a majority of the network sign it.
To encourage honest behavior, the elected miner and signers get rewards when the suggested
block is accepted.
3 Concurrent and Ergodic Games
Probability distributions. For a finite set A, a probability distribution on A is a function
δ : A→ [0, 1] such that
∑
a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A
by D(A). Given a distribution δ ∈ D(A), we denote by Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the
support of the distribution.
Concurrent game structures. A concurrent stochastic game structure G = (S,A,Γ1,Γ2, δ)
has the following components:
A finite state space S and a finite set A of actions (or moves).
Two move assignments Γ1,Γ2 : S → 2A \ ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γi associates with
each state s ∈ S the non-empty set Γi(s) ⊆ A of moves available to Player i at state s.
A probabilistic transition function δ : S×A×A→ D(S), which associates with every state
s ∈ S and moves a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s), a probability distribution δ(s, a1, a2) ∈ D(S)
for the successor state.
We denote by n the number of states (i.e., n = |S|), and by m the maximal number of actions
available for a player at a state (i.e., m = maxs∈S max{|Γ1(s)|, |Γ2(s)|}). The size of the
transition relation of a game structure is defined as
|δ| =
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
∑
a2∈Γ2(s) |Supp(δ(s, a1, a2))| ≤ n
2 ·m2.
Plays. At every state s ∈ S, Player 1 chooses a move a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and simultaneously and
independently Player 2 chooses a move a2 ∈ Γ2(s). The game then proceeds to the successor
state t with probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t), for all t ∈ S. A path or a play of G is an infinite
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Figure 2 A repetitive rock-paper-scissors game.
sequence π =
(
(s0, a01, a02), (s1, a11, a12), (s2, a21, a22) . . .
)
of states and action pairs such that for
all k ≥ 0 we have (i) aki ∈ Γi(sk); and (ii) sk+1 ∈ Supp(δ(sk, ak1 , ak2)). We denote by Π the
set of all paths.
I Example 1. Consider a repetitive game of rock-paper-scissors, consisting of an infinite
number of laps, in which each lap is made of a number of rounds as illustrated in Figure
2. When a lap begins, the two players play rock-paper-scissors repetitively until one of
them wins 3 rounds more than her opponent, in which case she wins the current lap of the
game and a new lap begins. In each round, the winner is determined by the usual rules of
rock-paper-scissors, i.e. rock beats scissors, scissors beat paper and paper beats rock. In case
of a tie, each player wins the round with probability 12 .
Here we have S = {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} and Γ1 = Γ2 ≡ {R,P,S}. The game starts at state 0
and state s corresponds to the situation where Player 1 has won s rounds more than Player 2
in the ongoing lap. Edges in the figure correspond to possible transitions in the game. Each
edge is labeled with three values a1, a2, p to denote that the game will transition from the
state at the beginning of the edge to the state at its end with probability p if the two players
decide on actions a1 and a2, respectively. For example, there is an edge from state 2 to state
0 labeled R, S, 1, which corresponds to δ(2,R, S)(0) = 1. In the figure, we use X,X in place
of a1, a2 to denote that they are equal. Hence every play in this game corresponds to an
infinite walk on the graph in Figure 2.
Strategies. A strategy is a recipe to extend prefixes of a play. Formally, a strategy for
Player i is a mapping σi : (S×A×A)∗×S → D(A) that associates with every finite sequence
x ∈ (S ×A×A)∗ of state and action pairs, representing the past history of the game, and
the current state s in S, a probability distribution σi(x · s) used to select the next move. The
strategy σi can only prescribe moves that are available to Player i; that is, for all sequences
x ∈ (S × A × A)∗ and states s ∈ S, we require Supp(σi(x · s)) ⊆ Γi(s). We denote by Σi
the set of all strategies for Player i. Once the starting state s and the strategies σ1 and
σ2 for the two players have been chosen, then the probabilities of measurable events are
uniquely defined [39]. For an event A ⊆ Π, we denote by Prσ1,σ2s (A) the probability that a
path belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players use the strategies σ1 and σ2.
We call a pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 a strategy profile.
Stationary (memoryless) and positional strategies. In general, strategies use randomiza-
tion, and can use finite or even infinite memory to remember the history. Simpler strategies,
that either do not use memory, or randomization, or both, are significant, as they are simple
to implement and interpret. A strategy σi is stationary (or memoryless) if it is independent
of the history but only depends on the current state, i.e., for all x, x′ ∈ (S ×A×A)∗ and all
s ∈ S, we have σi(x · s) = σi(x′ · s), and thus can be expressed as a function σi : S → D(A).
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A strategy is pure if it does not use randomization, i.e., for any history there is a unique
action a that is played with probability 1. A pure stationary strategy σi is called positional,
and denoted as a function σi : S → A.
Mean-payoff objectives. We consider maximizing limit-average (or mean-payoff) objectives
for Player 1, and the objective of Player 2 is the opposite (i.e., the games are zero-sum).
We consider concurrent games with a reward function R : S × A × A → R that assigns
a reward value R(s, a1, a2) for all s ∈ S, a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and a2 ∈ Γ2(s). For a path π =(
(s0, a01, a02), (s1, a11, a12), . . .
)
, the average for T steps is AvgT (π) = 1T ·
∑T−1
i=0 R(si, ai1, ai2), and
the limit-inferior average (resp. limit-superior average) is defined as follows: LimInfAvg(π) =
lim infT→∞ AvgT (π) (resp. LimSupAvg(π) = lim supT→∞ AvgT (π)). We denote concurrent
mean-payoff games as CMPGs.
I Example 2. Consider the game in Figure 2. In this game, Player 1 wins a lap whenever
a red edge is crossed. Therefore, in order to capture the number of laps won by Player 1,
rewards can be assigned as: R(2, R, S) = R(2, P,R) = R(2, S, P ) = 1; R(2, X,X) = 12 and 0
in all other cases.
Values and ε-optimal strategies. Given a CMPG G and a reward function R, the lower
value vs (resp. the upper value vs) at a state s is defined as follows:
vs = supσ1∈Σ1 infσ2∈Σ2 E
σ1,σ2
s [LimInfAvg]; vs = infσ2∈Σ2 supσ1∈Σ1 E
σ1,σ2
s [LimSupAvg].
The determinacy result of [30] shows that the upper and lower values coincide and give
the value of the game denoted as vs. For ε ≥ 0, a strategy σ1 for Player 1 is ε-optimal if we
have vs − ε ≤ infσ2∈Σ2 Eσ1,σ2s [LimInfAvg].
Ergodic Games. A CMPG G is ergodic if for all states s, t ∈ S, for all strategy profiles
(σ1, σ2), if we start at s, then t is visited infinitely often with probability 1 in the random
walk πσ1,σ2s . The game in Figure 2 is not ergodic. If Player 1 keeps playing rock and Player 2
scissors, then the states −1 and −2 are visited at most once. However, a more realistic
version of this game is also ergodic.
I Example 3. Consider two players playing the repetitive game of rock-paper-scissors over
a network, e.g. the Internet. The game is loaded on a central server that asks the players for
their moves and provides them with rewards and information about changes in the state of
the game. Given that the network is not perfect, there is always a small probability that one
of the players is unable to announce his move in time to the server. In such cases, the player
will lose the current round. Assume that this scenario happens with probability ε > 0. Then
all probabilities in Figure 2 have to be multiplied by (1− ε) and new transitions, which are
not under players’ control and are a result of uncertainty in the network connection, should
be added to the game. These new transitions are illustrated in Figure 3. Here a star can be
replaced by any permissible action of the players. It is easy to check that this variant of the
game is ergodic, given that starting from any state, there is a positive probability of visiting
any other state within 3 steps using the new transitions only.
Results about general CMPGs. The main results for CMPGs are as follows:
1. The celebrated result of existence of values was established in [30].
2. For CMPGs, stationary or finite-memory strategies are not sufficient for optimality,
and even in CMPGs with three states (the well-known Big Match game), very complex
infinite-memory strategies are required for ε-optimality [5].
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Figure 3 Transitions due to network connectivity issues in the repetitive RPS.
3. The value problem, that given a CMPG, a state s, and a threshold λ, asks whether
the value at state s is at least λ, can be decided in PSPACE [14]; and also in m2O(n)
time, which is doubly exponential in the worst case, but polynomial-time in m, for n
constant [23]. Both the above algorithms use the theory of reals and quantifier elimination
for analysis.
I Remark (Inefficiency). The quantifier elimination approach for general CMPGs considers
formulas in the theory of reals with alternation, where the variables represent the trans-
itions [14]. With as few as ten transitions, quantifier elimination produces formulas with
hundreds of variables over the existential theory of reals. In turn, the existential theory of
reals has exponential-time complexity, is notoriously hard to solve, and its existing solvers
cannot handle hundreds of variables. Hence, CMPGs with as few as ten transitions are not
tractable.
Results about ergodic CMPGs. The main results for ergodic CMPGs are as follows:
1. Stationary optimal strategies exist[24], but positional strategies are not sufficient for
optimality. For precise strategy complexity see [13].
2. Even in ergodic games, values and probabilities of optimal strategies can be irrational [13],
and hence the relevant question is the approximation problem of values which is solvable
in non-deterministic polynomial-time [13].
3. The most well-known algorithm for ergodic mean-payoff games is the Hoffman-Karp
strategy-iteration algorithm [24]. See [10] for a more detailed treatment of this algorithm.
Note that since in ergodic games, every state is reached from every other state with probabil-
ity 1, the value at all states is the same.
4 Modeling Framework
In this section we present an abstract framework to model economical consequences of attacks
with mean-payoff games. In particular we show how broad classes of attacks can be modeled
as ergodic games. In the next section we present concrete examples that arise from blockchain
protocols.
4.1 Mean-payoff games modeling
We describe two aspects of mean-payoff games modeling.
1. Game graph modeling. Graph games are a standard model for reactive systems as well as
protocols. The states and transitions of the graph represent states and transitions of the
reactive system, and paths in the graphs represent traces of the system [33, 34]. Similarly,
in modeling of protocols with different variables for the agents, the states of the game
represent various scenarios of the protocols along with the valuation of the variables. The
transitions represent a change of the scenario along with change in the valuation of the
variables (for example see [16] for game graph modeling of protocols for digital-contract
signing).
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2. Mean-payoff objective modeling. In mean-payoff objectives, the costs (or rewards) of
every transition can represent, for example, delays, execution times, cost of context
switches, cost of concurrency, or monetary gains and losses. The mean-payoff objective
represents the long-term average of the rewards or the costs. The mean-payoff objective
has been used for synthesis of better reactive systems [7], synthesis of synchronization
primitives for concurrent data-structures to minimize average context-switch costs [9],
model resource-usage in container analysis and frequency of function calls [15], as well as
analysis of energy-related objectives [3, 2, 21].
4.2 Crypto-currency Protocols as Mean-payoff Games
We describe how to apply the general framework of CMPGs to crypto-currencies:
General setting. We propose to analyze protocols as a game between a defender and an
attacker. The defender and the attacker have complete freedom to decide on their moves.
The decisions of the other parties in the ecosystem can be modeled as stochastic choices
that are not adversarial to either of the players.
Reward function. The reward function will reflect the monetary gain or loss of the
defender. The attacker gain is not modeled as we consider the worst-case scenario in
which the attacker’s objective is to minimize the defender’s utility.
States. States of the game can represent the information that is relevant for the analysis
of the protocol, such as the abstract state of the blockchain.
Stochastic transitions. Probabilities over the transitions can model true stochastic
processes e.g., mining, or abstract complicated situations where the exact behavior cannot
be directly computed (see Section 5.2) or in order to simulate the social behavior of a
group (see Section 5.1).
Concurrent interactions. Concurrent games are used when both players decide on their
action simultaneously or when a single action models a behavior that continues over a
time period and the players can only reason about their opponent’s behavior after a while
(Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
Result of the game. In this work we want to reason on defender’s security in a protocol
wrt a malicious attacker who aims to decrease defender’s gain at any cost. The result of
the mean-payoff game will describe the inevitable expected loss that the defender will
have in the presence of an attacker and defender’s strategy describes the best way to
defend himself against such an attacker.
4.3 Modeling with Ergodic Games
In this section we describe two classes of attacks, which can be naturally modeled with
ergodic games. Our description here is high-level and informal, and concrete instances are
considered in the next section. The attacks we describe are in a more general setting than
crypto-currencies; however, for crypto-currencies the economic consequences are more natural
to model.
First class of attacks. In the first class of attacks the setting consists of two companies and
the revenues of the companies depend on the number of users each has. Thus states represent
the number of users. Each company can decide to attack its competing company. Performing
an attack entails some economic costs, however it could increase the number of users of the
attacking company at the expense of the attacked one. For example, consider two competing
social networks, Alice and Bob. Alice can decide to launch a distributed-denial-of-service
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(DDOS) attack on Bob, and vice-versa. Such attacks entail a cost, but provide incentives for
Bob users to switch to Alice. The rewards depend on the network revenues (i.e., number
of users) and on the amount of funds the company decides to spend for the attack. The
migration of users is a stochastic process that is biased towards the stronger network, but
with smaller probability some users migrate to the other network. Thus the game is ergodic.
This class represents pool attacks in the context of crypto-currencies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3).
Second class of attacks. Consider the scenario where the state of the game represents
aspects of the dynamic network topology. The network evolves over the course of the time,
and the actions of the participants also affect the network topology. However, the effect of
the actions only makes local changes. The combination of the global changes and the local
effects still ensure that different network states can be reached, and the game is ergodic.
Attacks in such a scenario where the network topology determines the outcome of attack
can be modeled as ergodic games. This class of attacks represent the zero-confirmation
double-spending attack in the context of crypto-currencies (see Section 5.2).
5 Formal Modeling of Real Attacks
In this section we show how to model several real-world examples. These examples were
described in the literature but were never analyzed as stateful games.
5.1 Block Withholding Pool Attack
Pools are susceptible to the classic block withholding attack [35], where a miner sends only
partial solutions to the pool manager and discards full solutions. In this section we analyze
block withholding attacks among two pools, pool A and pool B. We describe how pool
A can attack pool B, and the converse direction is symmetric. To employ the pool block
withholding attack, pool A registers at pool B as a regular miner. It receives tasks from
pool B and transfers them to some of its own miners. Following the notions in [19], we
call these infiltrating miners, and their mining power is called infiltration rate. When pool
A’s infiltrating miners deliver partial solutions, pool A’s manager submits them to pool B’s
manager and proves the portion of work they did. When the infiltrating miners deliver a full
solution, the attacking pool manager discards it.
At first, the total revenue of the victim pool does not change (as its effective mining rate
was not changed), but the same sum is now divided among more miners. Thus, since the
pool manager fees are nominal (fixed percentage of the total revenue [4]), in the short term,
the manager of the victim pool will not lose. The attacker’s mining power is reduced, since
some of its miners are used for block withholding, but it earns additional revenue through
its infiltration of the other pool. Finally, the total effective mining power in the system is
reduced, causing the blockchain protocol to reduce the difficulty. Hence, in some scenarios,
the attacker can gain, even in the short run, from performing the attack [19].
In the long run, if miners see a decrease in their profits (since they have to split the same
revenue among more participants), it is likely that they consider to migrate to other pools.
As a result, the victim pool’s total revenue will decrease.
Our modeling. We aim to capture the long term consequences of pool attacks. We have
two pools A and B, where B is the victim pool and A is the malicious pool who wishes to
decrease B’s profits. There is also a group of miners C who are honest and represent the
rest of the network. In return, pool B can defend itself by attacking back. To simulate the
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long term effect, in every round pool members from A and B may migrate from one pool to
another or to and from C. The migration is a stochastic process that favors the pool with
maximum profitability for miners. We note that given sufficient amount of time (say a week),
a pool manager can evaluate with very high probability the fraction of infiltrating miners in
his pool. This can be done by looking at the ratio between full and partial solutions. Hence,
in retrospect of a week, the pools are aware of each other’s decisions, but within this week
there is uncertainty. Therefore, we use concurrent games to analyze the worst case scenario
for pool B.
I Theorem 4. Consider a pair of pools A and B capable of attacking each other. Let C be
the pool of remaining miners. If the miners in each pool migrate stochastically according to
the attractiveness levels (as detailed below), then B can ensure a revenue of at least v on
average per round, against any behavior of A, where v is the value of the concurrent ergodic
game described below.
5.1.1 Details of Modeling
We provide details of our modeling on some of the attacks to demonstrate how they can be
thought of in terms of ergodic games. Details of all other attacks can be found in [10].
Game states. We consider two pools, A and B and assume that any miner outside these
two is mining independently for himself. Each state is defined by two values, i.e. the
fractions of total computation power that belongs to A and B. We use a discretized version
of this idea to model the game in a finite number of states and let S = {1, 2, . . . , n}2
and define ε = 12n+1 , where a state (i1, i2) ∈ S corresponds to the case where pool A
owns a fraction αi1 = i1ε = i12n+1 of the total hash power and pool B controls a fraction
βi2 = i2ε = i22n+1 of it. In this case the miners who work independently own a fraction
γi1,i2 = 1− αi1 − βi2 of the total hash power.
Actions at each state. Each pool can choose how much of its hash power it devotes
to attacking the other pool. More formally, at each state s = (i1, i2), pool A has i1
choices of actions and Γ1(s) = {a01, a11, a21, . . . , a
i1−1
1 } where a
j
1 corresponds to attacking
pool B with a fraction jε of the total computing power of the network. Similarly
Γ2(s) = {a02, a12, a22, . . . , a
i2−1
2 }.
Rewards. We want the rewards to model the revenue (profit) of pool A, denoted by
rA, so we let R(s, ai1, a
j
2) = rA(s, ai1, a
j
2), for a1 ∈ Γ1(s), a2 ∈ Γ2(s). We write rA
instead of rA(s, ai1, a
j
2) when there is no risk of confusion. We define rB and rC similarly
and normalize the revenues: rA + rB + rC = 1. To compute these values, we define
“attractiveness”. The attractiveness of a pool is its revenue divided by the total computing
power of its miners. If pool A chooses the action ai1 and pool B chooses the action a
j
2,
then pool A is using a fraction α′ = iε of the total network computing power to attack
B and is receiving a corresponding fraction of B’s revenue while not contributing to it.
Therefore the attractiveness of pool B will be equal to: attrB = rBβ+α′ . Similarly we have
attrA = rAα+β′ , where β
′ = jε.
Now consider the sources for pool A’s revenue. It either comes from A’s own mining
process or from collecting shares of B’s revenue, therefore:
rA = (α− α′) + α′ × attrB ,
and similarly rB = (β − β′) + β′ × attrA. The previous four equations provide us with a
system of linear equations which we can solve to obtain the values of rA, rB , attrA and
attrB. Since a fraction α′ + β′ of total computation power is used on attacking other
pools, we have: attrC = 11−α′−β′ .
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Game transitions (δ). Miners migrate between pools and a pool gains or loses mining
power based on its attractiveness. If a pool is the most attractive option among the
two, it gains ε new mining power with probability 23 , retains its current power with
probability 16 and loses ε power with probability
1
6 . On the other hand a pool that is not
the most attractive option loses ε power with probability 23 , retains its current power
with probability 16 and attracts ε new mining power with probability
1
6 . These values
were chosen for the purpose of demonstration of our algorithm and our implementation
results. In practice, one can obtain realistic probabilities experimentally.
Ergodicity. The game is ergodic because for each two states s = (s1, s2) and s′ = (s′1, s′2)
where |s1 − s′1| ≤ 1 and |s2 − s′2| ≤ 1, there is at least 136 probability of going from s to s
′
no matter what choices the players make.
Proof of Theorem 4. Ergodicity was established in the final part above. The rest follows
from the modeling and the determinacy result.
5.2 Zero-confirmation Double-spending
Nowadays, Bitcoin is increasingly used in “fast payments” such as online services, ATM
withdrawals and vending machines [17], where the payment is followed by fast delivery of
goods. While the blockchain consensus is appropriate for slow payments, it requires tens
of minutes to confirm a transaction and is therefore inappropriate for fast payments. We
consider a transaction confirmed when it is added to the blockchain and several blocks are
added after it. This mechanism is essential for the detection of double-spending attacks in
which an adversary attempts to use some of her coins for two or more payments. However,
even in the absence of a confirmation, it is far from trivial to perform a double-spending
attack. In a double spending attack, the attacker publishes two transactions that consume
the same input. The attack is successful only if the victim node received one transaction
and provided the goods before he became aware of the other, but eventually the latter was
added to the blockchain. In an ideal world the attacker can increase his odds by broadcasting
one transaction directly to the victim and the other at a far apart location, while on the
other hand the victim can defend itself by deploying several nodes in the network in strategic
locations. In the real world, however, the full topology of the network is never known to
either of the parties. Nevertheless, based on history and network statistics one can estimate
the odds of a successful attack given the current state of the network [6].
The victim has to decide on a policy for accepting zero-confirmation transactions. In
particular he has to decide on the probability of whether to wait for a confirmation or not.
If he waits for confirmation, then the payment is guaranteed, but customer satisfaction is
damaged, and as a result the utility is smaller than the actual payment. If he does not wait
for a confirmation, then the payment might be double spent. In the long term, the victim
could decide to change the topology of the network. As it does not have full control over the
topology, the outcome of the change is stochastic. Moreover, even when the victim does not
initiate a change, the network topology is dynamic and keeps changing all the time. Hence,
the odds of a successful attack are constantly changing in small stochastic steps.
Our modeling. We aim to analyze the worst case long run loss of the victim. In our model
we abstract the network topology state and consider only the odds of successful double
spending. We consider a scenario where the victim’s honest customers typically purchase
goods worth 10 units per round. In every round, the victim decides on a policy for accepting
fast payment, and the attacker, concurrently, unaware of the victim’s policy, has to decide the
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size of the attack. After every round, the victim decides if he wants to do a thorough change
in the network topology. If he decides on a change, then the next state is chosen uniformly
from all possible states (this represents the fact that neither players has full knowledge on
the topology). If he decides to make no change, then the network state might still change,
due to the dynamic nature of the network. In this case the next state is with high probability
either the current state, or a state which is slightly better or slightly worse for the victim,
but with low probability the state changes completely to an arbitrary state in the network
(as sometimes small changes in the topology have big impact). The rewards stem from the
outcome of each round in the following way: The payment is the sum of the honest customer
purchases and the payment of the attacker (if it gets into the blockchain). The reward is the
payment minus some penalty in case the victim has decided to wait for a confirmation. The
fact that the network state is constantly changing makes our model ergodic.
I Theorem 5 (Proof in [10]). Consider a seller and an attacker in the zero-confirmation
double spending problem. The seller can ensure profit of at least v on average per round,
where v is the value of the corresponding CMPG.
5.3 Proof of Stake Pool Attack
Proof of stake protocols let miners centralize their stakes in a pool. In such pools the
withholding attack is not relevant as mining does not require physical resources. However,
pool A might attack an opponent pool B by not signing or broadcasting its blocks. A
successful attack would prevent the block from getting signed by a majority of the network
and result in a loss of mining fees for B and can encourage miners to migrate from B. An
unsuccessful attack decreases A’s signing revenue.
Our modeling. We assume a setting similar to that of Section 5.1, where there are two
opponent pools A and B, and the rest of the network consists of honest pools who sign every
block that arrives on time. The states of the game are the stakes of each pool, namely α for
pool A and β for pool B. In every round, with probability 1− (α+ β) neither of the pools is
elected to mine a block, and no decisions are made. Otherwise, with probability αα+β pool A
is elected and otherwise pool B is elected. When a pool is elected, the other pool decides
whether to sign and broadcast the resulting block or not. In addition the network state and
connectivity induce a distribution over the fraction of honest miners that receive the block.
If the block is accepted, then its creator is rewarded with mining fees, and the other pool
will get its signing fees only if it signed the block.
I Theorem 6 (Proof in [10]). Consider two pools A and B in a proof of stake mining system
that can choose to attack each other by not signing blocks mined by the other pool. Consider
that the rest of the network consists of independent miners who observe published blocks
according to a predefined probability distribution and sign every valid block they observe. If
the miners migrate according to the attractiveness levels (as described in Section 5.1), then
B can ensure an average revenue of v against any behavior of A, where v is the value of the
corresponding CMPG.
6 Implementation and Experimental Results
Implementation. We have implemented the strategy-iteration algorithm for ergodic games
(see [10] for pseudo-code and more details). The implementation is available at http://ist.
ac.at/~akafshda/concur2018. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation
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Table 1 Experimental results for block-withholding pool attack (left), zero-confirmation double-
spending (center) and proof of stake pool attack (right).
#T States #SI Time(s)
17050 100 4 69
56252 196 2 291
135252 289 2 389
236000 400 2 1059
331816 484 2 3880
508032 576 2 6273
720954 676 2 17014
966281 784 2 53103
1269450 900 2 100435
#T States #SI Time(s)
19940 100 2 426
40040 200 2 800
60140 300 2 1141
80240 400 2 1586
100340 500 2 2069
120440 600 2 1253
140540 700 2 2999
160640 800 2 3496
180740 900 2 3917
#T States #SI Time(s)
6076 99 18 471
20956 275 8 1338
31744 396 9 2520
44764 539 4 1073
77500 891 16 22125
119164 1331 27 32636
169756 1859 10 31597
262384 2816 12 89599
of this algorithm. The straightforward implementation of the strategy-iteration algorithm
for ergodic games has two practical problems, which we describe below.
1. No stopping criteria. First, the strategy-iteration algorithm only guarantees convergence
of values in the limit, and since values and probabilities in strategies can be irrational,
convergence cannot be guaranteed in a finite number of steps. Hence we need a stopping
criterion for approximation.
2. Numerical precision issues. Second, the stationary strategies in each iteration are obtained
by solving LPs, which has numerical errors, and the probabilities sum to less than 1.
If these errors remain, they cascade over iterations, and do not ensure convergence in
practice for large examples. Hence we need to ensure numerical precision on top of the
strategy-iteration algorithm.
Our solution for the above two problems are as follows:
1. Stopping criteria. We first observe that the value sequence which is obtained converges
from below to the value of the game. In other words, the value sequence provide a lower
bound to the lower value of the game. Hence we consider a symmetric version which is the
strategy-iteration algorithm for player 2, and run each iteration of the two algorithms in
sequence. The version for player 2 provides a lower bound on the lower value for player 2,
and thus from that we can obtain an upper bound on the upper value of player 1. Since
the upper and lower values coincide, we thus have both an upper and lower bound on the
values, and once the difference is smaller than ε > 0, then the algorithm has correctly
approximated the value within ε and can stop and return the value and the strategy
obtained as approximation.
2. Numerical precision. For numerical precision, instead of obtaining the results from the
linear program, we obtain the set of tight and slack constraints, where the tight constraints
represent the constraints where equality is obtained, and the other constraints are slack
ones. From the tight constraints, which are equalities, we obtain the result using Gaussian
elimination, which provides more precise values to the solution. We also tried other
heuristics, such as adding the remaining probability to the greatest probability action,
which led to similar results on convergence.
Experimental Results. Our experimental results are reported in Table 1. We show number
of transitions in the game (#T), number of states in the game, the running time and number
of strategy iterations (#SI). It is noteworthy that in all cases the number of iterations
required is quite small. We also note that since the number of iterations is small, the crucial
computational step is every iteration, where many LPs are solved. The outputs provided the
following results (more details in [10]):
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For the block withholding pool attack game, the algorithm could guarantee a mean-payoff
of 0.49 for the victim pool. In absence of an attacker the mean-payoff will be 1.
For the zero-confirmation double-spending game, the algorithm verified that the seller
is guaranteed to maintain at least half of her revenue, i.e., in presence of a malicious
attacker, the value for the seller converges to 5 as the number of states increase, while it
is 10 in absence of it.
For the proof of stake pool attack game, by increasing the number of states, i.e., by
refining the discretization, the guaranteed value (game value) decreases and tends to zero.
In absence of an attacker, a pool A can achieve an expected payoff of 11sA at a turn
where sA is the stake it holds.
7 Related Work
Pools attack. The danger of a block withholding attack is as old as Bitcoin pools. The
attack was described by Rosenfeld [35], as pools were becoming a dominant player in
Bitcoin. While it was obvious that a pool is vulnerable to a malicious attacker, Eyal [19]
showed that in some circumstances a pool can benefit by attacking another pool, and
thus pool mining is vulnerable also in the presence of rational attackers. However, the
analysis only considered the short term, i.e., the profit that the pool can get only in the
short period after the attack. Laszka et al. [29] studied the long term impact of pools
attack. In their framework miners are allowed to migrate from one pool to another. They
analyzed the steady equilibrium in which the size of the pools become stable (although
there is no guarantee that the game will converge to such a scenario). Our framework is
the first to allow analysis of long term impacts without convergence assumptions.
Zero-confirmation double-spending. Zero-confirmation double-spending was experiment-
ally analyzed by Karame et al. [25] who gave numerical figures for the odds of successful
double spending for different network states. However, their analysis did not consider
that the victim may change his connectivity state. Our work is the first analysis of the
long term impact of this attack.
Stateful analysis. A stateful analysis of blockchain attacks was done by Sapirshtein et
al. [36] and by Sompolinsky and Zohar [38]. In their analysis the different states of the
blockchain were taken into account during the attack. The analysis was done using MDPs
in which only the attacker decides on his actions and the victim follows a predefined
protocol. A recent work [11] also considers abstraction-refinement for finite-horizon
games based on smart contracts. However, it neither considers long-term behavior, nor
mean-payoff objectives, nor can it model attacks such as double-spending and interactions
between pools.
Quantitative verification with mean-payoff games. The mean-payoff games problem has
been studied extensively as a theoretical problem [33, 34]. It has also been studied in
the context of verification and synthesis for performance related issues [7, 9, 15, 3, 2, 21].
However, all these works focus on turn-based games, and none of them consider concurrent
games. To the best of our knowledge concurrent mean-payoff games have not been studied
in the setting of security that we consider, where the quantitative objective is as crucial
as safety critical issues. Practical implementation of algorithms for ergodic CMPGs do
not exist in the literature.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we considered concurrent mean-payoff games, and in particular the subclass
of ergodic games, to analyze attacks on crypto-currencies. There are several interesting
directions to pursue: First, various notions of rationality are relevant to analyze games where
the attacker is rational, rather than malicious, and aims to maximize his own utility instead
of minimizing the defender’s utility (e.g., secure-equilibria [12] or other related notions).
Second, we consider two-player games, and the extension to multi-player games to model
crypto-currency attacks is another interesting problem. Third, the modeling assumptions
should be empirically validated and the parameters used to generate the games, e.g. the rates
of migration, should be empirically obtained. Fourth, we consider the rest of the network to
be neutral and stochastic. An interesting extension would be to consider a rational network,
possibly consisting of coalitions of cooperating miners, as defined e.g. in [27].
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